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ACTUAL VERSUS LEGAL CONTROL: READING
VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT INTO THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998
Charles S. Wright
Abstract. Title 11 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 purports to limit the
liability of Internet service providers that have been found vicariously liable for copyright
infringement. However, by basing this limitation on the absence of the "benefit" and
"control" elements of the common law test for vicarious liability, the plain language of Title
%I, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512, appears to preclude statutory protection once a court has
found a service provider vicariously liable. This Comment argues that courts must read a
narrow definition of "actual" control into 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) in order to preserve the
liability limitations of Title I% to avoid structural conflict, and to fulfill legislative intent. This
Comment locates actual control in a line of district court cases from the Second Circuit that
have been eclipsed by the Ninth Circuit's embrace of "legal" control. This Comment
concludes that an actua-control standard best preserves incentives to monitor for
infringement.
In December 1999, eBay, the Internet's most popular auction site,
claimed that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA)2
provides disincentives for the company to police its web site for
copyright infringement.3 EBay contended that the liability limitations of
Title II of the DMCA,4 which were intended to shield Internet service
providers from monetary liability for copyright infringement by users of
1. See Web Watch, Fortune, Dec. 1, 1999, at 29 (noting that eBay draws more than 10 million
visitors per month).
2. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (Supp.
IV 1999)).
3. See Matt Richtel, EBay Says Law Discourages Auction Monitoring, N.Y. Times CyberTimes,
Dec. 10, 1999 (visited May 11, 2000) <www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/tech/indexcyber.html> (using
search term "ebay").
4. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. IV 1999). The DMCA contains five titles: L WIPO Treaties
Implementation (barring anti-circumvention technology and protecting copyright management
information), IL On-line Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (limiting service provider
liability), Ill. Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance Act (exempting copies made for repair
purposes from copyright violation); IV. Miscellaneous Provisions. and V. Vessel Hull Design
Protection Act (protecting boat hull designs). See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1999)).
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their services,5 are unavailable to any service provider that demonstrates
the "ability to control" infringing activity by actually monitoring its site
for infringement.6 "If we start[] to monitor," noted eBay's associate
general counsel, "we then take responsibility ... for all information on
the site,"7 including the unauthorized sound recordings that are inevitable
on an auction site that adds almost half a million new items daily.8
On-line auctions and other negotiated pricing venues are perhaps the
most novel of the business models instituted on the Internet.9 Charging a
percentage commission of each sale,1" on-line auction sites allow users to
post items for sale to the highest offer from a worldwide pool of bidders.
By overcoming the significant transaction costs of geography and market
access, these sites provide fora for market transactions that would be
impossible in the brick-and-mortar world, usually with little or no
intervention by the auction site itself.1' Given the burgeoning popularity
of these entities, 2 they are both fertile grounds for infringement 3 and
prototypes of future e-commerce models. 4 No court has yet addressed
the legal status of on-line auctions.
EBay's uncertainty about monitoring stems from the DMCA's
incorporation of the common law doctrine of vicarious liability for
5. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-796, at 73 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 639, 649.
6. Richtel, supra note 3.
7. Id.
8. Id. In late 1999, a California man sued eBay for the alleged sale of illegally made sound
recordings. See id. In addition, an unauthorized copy of a network holiday special appeared for
auction before broadcast. See Csar G. Soriano, Thieving "La Vida" Brokers, USA Today, Nov. 15,
1999, at D1.
9. See generally Robert D. Hof, Who Will Profit From the Internet: E-Bazaars are Changing the
Way Products are Being Made, Bought and Sold, Bus. Wk., June 5, 2000, at EB56.
10. See eBay Seller Guide (visited May 12, 2000) <http://pages.ebay.com/help/sellerguide
selling-fees.html> (calculating Final Value Fee as percentage of final sale).
11. See eBay User Agreement, § 3.1 (visited May 12, 2000) <http://pages.ebay.com/help/
community/png-user.html> ("Our site acts as the venue for sellers to list items.., and buyers to bid
on items .... [W]e have no control over the quality, safety or legality of the items advertised .... );
see also Richard A. White, Overcoming Regulatory Barriers to Successful E-Commerce, 570
PLI/Pat. 703, 708-09 (1999) ("An Internet auction is vastly different from a traditional auction:
there is no auctioneer acting as the seller's agent, the transfer of title occurs directly between seller
and buyer....").
12. See Jim Carlton, EBay Net Rises by 66%. Ahead of Expectations, Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 2000, at
B7 (noting eBay's 12.6 million registered users); George Anders, EBay Net Jumped 85% in Quarter
on Sales Gains, Beating Estimates, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 2000, at B8 (noting eBay is largest
consumer-oriented electronic-commerce site).
13. See Soriano, supra note 8, at DI (noting pre-broadcast auction of network holiday special).
14. See generally Hof, supra note 9 (describing various Internet commerce models).
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copyright infringement. The judicial doctrine turns on a two-part test of
"control" and "benefit."' 5 Congress intended to limit vicarious liability
on-line'6 and Title II of the DMCA appears to codify this doctrine at 17
U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B). Title II limits the extent of liability for on-line
copyright infringement by providing a series of "safe harbors" from
monetary liability to qualifying service providers. 7 Yet the "user
storage" safe harbor of § 512(c) excludes service providers who "receive
a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a
case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control
such activity."' 8 This language tracks the test for vicarious liability for
copyright infringement. 9 Because a vicariously liable service provider
by definition has control and receives direct financial benefit, the plain
language of this bar makes the safe harbor unavailable to any service
provider that has already been found vicariously liable. Compounding
this confusion, courts and commentators have developed two distinct
applications of control, one based on mere "legal" control, the other
based on "actual" or "practical" control.2"
A narrow construction of the codified control prong can both salvage
protection for qualifying service providers and preserve the "clean, well-
lit place"' 1 where entities like eBay can monitor their sites without fear
of losing safe-harbor protection.' This Comment argues that actual
control must be read into 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) in order to reconcile
Title II with common law vicarious liability and to preserve the structural
15. See Demetriades v. Kaufman, 690 F. Supp. 289, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[B]enefit and control
are the signposts of vicarious liability.").
16. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-796, at 73 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 639, 649;
H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 53 (1998); S. Rep. No. 105-190, at40 (1998).
17. See infra Part V.A.
18. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1999).
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See Tilman E. Self Il, Note, The Vicarious Liability of Trade Show Organizers for the
Copyright Infringement of Exhibitors, 5 Tex. Intell. Prop. L. 81, 89 (1996); see also infra Part II.
21. Richtel, supra note 3 (describing eBay's intent to monitor for infringement).
22. This construction would affect more than on-line auctions. At the time this Comment went to
press, a suit against the Napster music-sharing system was pending in U.S. District Court, and one of
the defendant's defenses against the claim of vicarious infringement was that the court should read a
narrow version of control into the DMCA's safe harbor provisions. See Opposition of Defendant
Napster, Inc. to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 20, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., No. C 99-5183MHP (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 7, 1999) (brief on file with author). To date, the
Napster court has rejected one claim of safe-harbor protection under the DMCA without ruling on
the others. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1746, 1751-52 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (rejecting defendant's § 512(a) safe harbor claim).
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integrity of Title II. A standard requiring actual control over and direct
financial benefit from the infringing activity for removal from the user-
storage safe harbor will clarify the scope of service-provider liability and
ensure protection for copyright holders by eliminating disincentives to
monitoring. Part I of this Comment traces the development of the control
and benefit test of vicarious liability. Part II delineates the split among
the circuits in the application of the actual and legal control tests for
vicarious liability. Part III identifies the challenges of applying these
control tests to the on-line environment, especially in light of scarce
judicial guidance to date. Part IV explores the link between the DMCA
and vicarious liability by examining § 512(c), a key safe harbor provision
of Title II. Part V argues that the interaction of statutory and judicial
standards of liability, combined with the structure and legislative history
of the DMCA, support reading actual control into § 512(c)(1)(B). Part V
concludes that such a reading produces the most efficient and effective
market result.
I. VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
The common law doctrine of vicarious liability for copyright
infringement imposes liability upon one party for the infringing actions
of another party,' thereby providing incentives to police market
relationships.24 By prompting market vigilance, this judicial extension of
liability enforces the limited monopoly created by copyright law.25 Part A
of this section explores the justification provided by copyright law for
imposing liability on parties other than the actual infringer. Part B details
the development of the "benefit-and-control" test for vicarious liability
for copyright infringement.
A. Defining Liability for Infringement: The Scope of Copyright Law
While technological change has provided Congress's primary impetus
to consider the reach of copyright protection,26 courts have generally
awaited congressional direction before applying copyright law to
23. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996).
24. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
25. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,442 (1984).
26. See id. at 430.
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emerging technologies.27 Article I of the U.S. Constitution vests
Congress with the power to grant limited monopolies in the form of
copyrights.28 The rights thus conferred are "exclusive," "for limited
Times," and protect "Writings and Discoveries."'29 The language of
Article I leaves to Congress the task of defining the impact of the
copyright monopoly on other substantive rights, the duration of
protection, and the types of works covered," and invites judicial
interpretation. This Comment examines one instance of legislative and
judicial interplay over copyright's impact on third-party rights.
Judicial extension of secondary liability" beyond the statutorily
defined scope of liability for copyright infringement has strengthened the
incentive structure of copyright law, despite statutory silence regarding
secondary liability.32 The exclusive rights established by 17 U.S.C. § 106
to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, and display a work33 provide
incentives for authors to create, which, in turn, serves "the ultimate aim"
of enhancing "the general public good."'34 While the Copyright Act of
19763' and its predecessor of 190936 are silent regarding such common
law doctrines as agency, joint and several liability, and third-party
liability, the 1976 Act does define an infringer as "[a]nyone who violates
any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner. 3 7 The U.S. Supreme
Court has noted that the lack of specific reference to secondary liability
within the Copyright Act "does not preclude the imposition of liability
27. See id at 431 ("[R]eluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright without
explicit legislative guidance is a recurring theme.").
28. U.S. Const. art. , § 8, cl. 8.
29. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
30. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429; see also Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518,
530 (1972) ("The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far
Congress has chosen to go can come only from Congress.").
31. See Black's Law Dictionary 926 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "secondary liability" as "liability
that does not arise unless the primarily liable party fails to honor its obligation").
32. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 433-35.
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
34. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). While this "economic"
rationale is widely accepted in the United States, an alternative "natural law justification" finds
support particularly in Europe. See Marshall Leaffer, Understanding Copyright Law § 1.7, at 18 (3d
ed. 1999).
35. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
36. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999)).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994).
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for copyright infringements on certain parties who have not themselves
engaged in the infringing activity." '38 Therefore, courts have imported the
tort doctrines of vicarious and enterprise liability into the copyright
context in order to enforce copyright law's limited monopoly. 9
"Direct" infringement is a necessary predicate to secondary liability.40
A copyright holder can establish direct infringement by proving "(1)
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements
of the work that are original."' "Copying" signifies more than
reproduction: it is "shorthand for the infringing of any of the copyright
owner's... exclusive rights" enumerated at 17 U.S.C. § 106.42 Such
copying must also amount to misappropriation.43 Although vicarious and
contributory liability' address the supporting roles played by other actors
within the ambit of infringement only after the lead actor has been
identified as liable, a finding of direct infringement can reverberate
widely and draw all associated actors into the scope of secondary
liability.
B. Development of a Two-Part Vicarious Liability Test for Copyright
Infringement
In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co.,45 the Second Circuit
was the first court to articulate a two-part test for vicarious liability for
38. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984).
39. See, e.g., id.; Demetriades v. Kaufnann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also W.
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 69, at 500 (5th ed. 1984) (defining
vicarious liability as "a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of risk"); id. § 72, at 516-17 (noting
that enterprise liability "rests upon an analogy to the law of partnership ... [in which] each is the
agent or servant of the others").
40. See generally Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 (noting vicarious liability holds "one individual account-
able for the actions of another").
41. Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
42. S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 n.3 (9th Cir. 1989).
43. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (establishing layperson quantitative
test to determine improper appropriation).
44. Vicarious and contributory liability are distinct doctrines of third-party liability. See
Demetriades, 690 F. Supp. at 292 n.5. Contributory liability reaches "one who, with knowledge of
the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another
.... "Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)
(citation omitted). Contributory infringement turns upon an inquiry into knowledge that is absent
from the relational inquiry of vicarious liability. See Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer
on Copyright (MB) § 12.04[A][1], at 12-68 (Sept. 1998).
45. 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
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copyright infringement. Jalen Amusement Company, operator of the
record departments in twenty-three of defendant Green's department
stores, directly infringed on the plaintiff's copyrights by selling
counterfeit music recordings." Reversing the dismissal of the complaint
against the department store, the court held that "[w]hen the right and
ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest
in the exploitation of copyrighted materials... the purposes of copyright
law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the
beneficiary of that exploitation."47 A court must find independent
evidence to satisfy each prong of the Shapiro control and benefit test in
order to find a defendant vicariously liable." This test has become the
cornerstone for finding vicarious liability in all copyright-infringement
cases, whether the activity implicates the right to reproduce,4 9 the right to
distribute,5" or the right to perform"' the protected work.
The Shapiro test evolved from two lines of cases displaying differing
degrees of third-party involvement in direct infringement. 2 First, the so-
called "landlord-tenant" cases absolved a landlord of responsibility for
the infringing activities of a tenant if the landlord lacked notice of the
infringement at the creation of the lease. 3 In contrast, the "dance-hall"
cases attached liability to proprietors of entertainment venues for the
infringing performances of musical compositions by bands and
orchestras.' This second line of cases premised liability primarily on the
direct financial benefit to the proprietors of the infringing performances,
whether or not the proprietor exercised any control over the selection of
the compositions.55
46. See/i&at306.
47. Ra at 307 (citation omitted).
48. See Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publ'g, Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1623, 1626 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(rejecting plaintiffs' "novel interpretation" of sliding scale between prongs); Nimmer & Nimmer,
supra note 44, § 12.04[A][1], at 12-68.
49. See RCA/Ariola Int'l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 781 (8th Cir. 1988).
50. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996).
51. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971).
52. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304,307-08 (2d Cir. 1963).
53. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686,688 (2d Cir. 1938); cf Fromont v. Aeolian Co., 254
F. 592,594 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
54. See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931); Dreamland Ball
Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354,355 (7th Cir. 1929).
55. See Buck, 283 U.S. at 198.
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Shapiro involved a high degree of actual control and direct benefit.
Green and Jalen enjoyed a close and mutually profitable relationship:
Jalen had been a constant presence in Green's stores for up to thirteen
years; Jalen and its employees were subject to Green's workplace rules;
Green reserved "unreviewable discretion" to fire Jalen employees; and
all receipts filtered through Green's cash registers, from which Green
deducted a percentage. 6 Analogizing to the dance-hall cases and
emphasizing its desire to prevent retailers from establishing "dummy"
concessions to act as buffers against liability for infringement, the court
justified burdening the department store owner Green, the party in the
best position to police infringement. 7
Shapiro sought to increase the diligence of market beneficiaries of
copyrighted material. 8 A well-policed market maximizes creators'
returns on their works, thereby increasing public good by stimulating the
production of more works.59 This incentive structure of vicarious liability
hinges upon the control necessary to monitor the source of financial
benefit.
II. CONFLICTING APPLICATIONS OF THE CONTROL PRONG
OF THE SHAPIRO TEST
Courts have adopted and commentators have elucidated two
approaches to the control prong of the Shapiro test. The narrow view
requires "actual" power to control.' The broad view extends liability to
any "legal" or "potential" power to control, thus finding control in every
legal relationship in which one party reserves, implicitly or explicitly,
control over the infringer.6' Both standards turn on the relationship
between the defendant and the direct infringer.
56. See Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 306.
57. See id. at 308-09.
58. See id. at 309.
59. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
60. Self, supra note 20, at 89-90.
61. Id.; see also Ian C. Bal Ion, Pinning the Blame in Cyberspace: Towards a Coherent Theory for
Imposing Vicarious Liability for Conduct Occurring Over the Internet, 18 Hastings Comm. & Ent.
L.J. 729, 749-50 (1996).
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A. The Narrow View: Actual Control
Courts and commentators that have predicated vicarious liability on
actual control have generally looked to the defendant's ongoing ability to
prevent the actual infringement 62 An actual-control standard cleaves to
the respondeat superior 3 roots of vicarious liability reflected in the
Shapiro court's search for "the right and ability to supervise."' Although
Shapiro authorized the extension of vicarious liability beyond employer-
employee relationships,' actual control requires evidence of "some
continuing connection between the two [parties] in regard to the
infringing activity." Actual control requires more than the potential
right to cease all activities undifferentiated from the infringement, the
right to terminate other activities, or the effective ability to terminate
only after infringement is evident.67 This standard reinforces Shapiro's
location of the power to police infringement only where enforcement
would be effective.68 Thus, an actual-control standard does not extend
liability to a defendant who could not take meaningful steps to prevent
infringement.
Demetriades v. KaufInann69 considered the copying of architectural
plans by a house developer and implicitly distinguished actual from mere
potential control by emphasizing "meaningful evidence . . . of cont-
rol over the direct infiingers."'7 The court dismissed the vicarious-
liability claim against a real estate broker who was the negotiating link
between the infringing developer and the infringing purchaser of a lot,
despite the broker's knowledge that the purchaser wanted the developer
62. See, e.g., Banff, Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (SD.N.Y. 1994); Ballon,
supra note 61, at 748.
63. The doctrine of respondeat superior holds masters liable for their servants' torts committed in
the scope of employment but excludes from liability the actions of an independent contractor. See
Restatement (Second) Agency § 219(1) (1957).
64. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963) (emphasis
added).
65. See ia (holding that agency principles should override "technical" differences between
employees and independent contractors); see also Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 44, § 12.04[A][1],
at 12-70 ("Vjicarious liability exceeds the traditional scope of the master-servant theory.").
66. Banff, 869 F. Supp. at 1110; see also Self, supra note 20, at 104.
67. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1497 (E.D. Cal. 1994), rev'd,
76 F.3d 259,264 (9th Cir. 1996).
68. See Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308.
69. 690 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
70. Id. at292.
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to copy the plans in developing the lot.7' Although the broker
coordinated sales negotiations, the court found no meaningful evidence
of ongoing control over either direct infringer.72 The broker was perhaps
in a better position than the copyright holder to deter infringement and
liability might have prompted vigilance within the real estate community,
but a position of potential prevention was insufficient without evidence
of control over the infringers.
The cost of policing can also preclude a finding of actual control. In
Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publishing, Inc.," copyright holders sued a
trade-show organizer for the unauthorized performances of protected
songs by vendors at the trade show.7 ' The court granted summary
judgment for the defendant, holding that "[t]he mere fact that they could
have policed the exhibitors at great expense is insufficient to impose
vicarious liability., 76 The court distinguished the possibility of policing
based on contractual privity from actual participation in "how exhibitors
conduct their business or even whether they use music at all. 77 The court
implicitly identified the latter as the standard for the Shapiro test. In the
court's estimation, the possibility of monitoring by the defendant did not
sufficiently overcome the prohibitive costs associated with the actual
ability to supervise so as to warrant liability.78
The actual-control standard also rejects any presumption of control
based on the mere existence of a legal relationship. Banff, Ltd. v. Limited,
Inc. , held that vicarious liability attaches only when there is evidence of
"some continuing connection... in regard to the infringing activity."8
Although it relied on Demetriades and Shapiro to insulate a corporate
parent from vicarious liability for the infringing actions of a subsidiary,
the Banff court did not limit the analysis to the "alter ego" doctrine of
71. Seeid. at 291.
72. See id. at 292.
73. See id.
74. 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1623 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
75. See id. at 1624.
76. Id. at 1627.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. 869 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
80. Id. at 1110.
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corporate law"' and explicitly refused to predicate liability on mere legal
control.8
2
Recognizing the tension between Artists Music's view of the requisite
degree of control and Shapiro's possible allowance for liability based on
"the mere opportunity to supervise, without something more," 3 the Banff
court sought to clarify the control element of Shapiro based on three
rationales. First, the court closely examined the "power to police"
rationale of Shapiro and concluded that "the formal relationship between
the parties is not the driving force behind liability."'" Instead, the
relationship must be sufficiently integrated to create a position to control
the actual infringement. 5 Second, the court noted that while respondeat
superior presumes control in an employment context, such a presumption
is unreasonable in other relationships.8 6 Given that the power to control is
not the same as exercising control, the court required evidence of the
latter in the form of continuing supervision."1 Finally, the court construed
the Second Circuit's application of the Shapiro test to a parent-subsidiary
relationship" as an implicit endorsement of the actual-control standard.8
Banff distinguished mere "potential to control" and concluded that
vicarious liability requires a showing of prior exercise of control over the
infringing activity itself."
At least one circuit court has shared Banffs limitation of actual
control to supervision of the infringing activity. In RCA/Ariola
International, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co.,9 the Eighth Circuit held
the manufacturer of a duplicating machine vicariously liable for retailers'
81. See i& at 1106 (defining "alter ego" doctrine as parent's liability for subsidiary that is "mere
instrumentality" of parent); see also Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 44, § 12.04[A], at 12-67 n.1 1
(indicating that vicarious and corporate liability are distinct, and that vicarious liability is equally
applicable to parent-subsidiary relationships).
82. See Banff, 869 F. Supp. at 1107 (rejecting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., 9
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1561 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding legal relationship between parent and subsidiary always
satisfied control prong for vicarious liability)).
83. Banff, 869 F. Supp. at 1108.
84. Id. at 1109.
85. See i.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 1109-10.
88. See Sygma Photo News, Inc. v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 778 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1985).
89. See Banff, 869 F. Supp. at 1110.
90. See id, The Banffcourt acknowledged that vicarious liability was a subsidiary issue in Sygma,
which was more readily characterized as a corporate "alter ego" case. See id at I 110 n.7.
91. 845 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1988).
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making of unauthorized copies of sound recordings for their customers."
The defendant argued that it should not be held liable simply because it
kept legal control by retaining title to the machines.93 The court assuaged
this concern by basing liability on letters the manufacturer had written to
the Recording Industry Association of America confirming that the
manufacturer was policing the use of the machines.' Vicarious liability
also attached to the company president because he "instruct[ed retailers]
on what uses of the copiers to permit."9' Read in light of Banff,
RCA/Ariola implicitly turned on meaningful evidence of an ongoing
relationship between the defendant and the direct infringers with regard
to the infringing activities.
B. The Expansive View: Legal Control
In contrast to the close examination of the parties' relationship that
characterizes the actual control approach, courts adopting the legal
control approach assign liability to anyone in a position to police
infringement.96 This approach emphasizes vicarious liability as a tool to
further the goals of copyright law.97 Any evidence of legal control, via
contract, agency, or even control unrelated to the infringement, opens the
door to a finding of vicarious liability.9" This broad reach has prompted
some commentators to suggest that legal control reduces the control
prong to a formality."
92. See id. at 781.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 782.
96, See, e.g., Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1163 (2d
Cir. 1971) (finding control where defendant was in "a position to police").
97. See id. at 1162; Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1320 (D.
Mass. 1994).
98. See Timothy L. Skelton, Comment, Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers:
The Case fora Negotiated Rulemaking Alternative, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 219,262-63 (1998).
99. See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Comment, New Legislation Regarding On-Line Service Provider
Liability for Copyright Infringement: A Solution in Search of a Problem? 38 IDEA 335, 348 (1998).
This view approaches the strict liability for Internet service providers advocated by President
William J. Clinton's Information Infrastructure Task Force in its 1995 "White Paper." See
Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information
Infrastructure 114-23 (1995).
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In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management,
Inc., ° the Second Circuit allowed the mere possibility of control to
satisfy the Shapiro test. The Gershwin court conceded that the defendant,
an organizer of a circuit of community concerts, "had no formal power to
control either the local association or the artists for whom [the defendant]
served as agent."' '° Nonetheless, the court reasoned that because the
local community associations "depended upon [the defendant] for
direction," the defendant was in a position to police the artists. 102
Arguably, the court could have found actual control in the fact that the
defendant collected all song titles for publication in its programs and
"deliberately made no effort to obtain copyright clearance."'0 3 Instead,
the Gershwin court read Shapiro as requiring only mere contractual
retention of the "ultimate right of supervision."'
' 4
A district court confronted with the same facts as Artists Music
illustrated the breadth of the legal control test. In Polygram International
Publishing, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc.,"°s the court adopted the Gershwin
standard by basing liability on the possibility of control reserved by
contract. 0 6 Similar to Artists Music, the Polygram court considered a
complaint by copyright holders against a trade-show organizer for the
unauthorized use of songs by booth operators. 7 In dicta thoroughly
analyzing vicarious liability,"°8 the court followed Gershwin by
emphasizing "the defendant's ability to spread losses and police conduct
within the enterprise."'" Based on this risk-allocation analysis, which
treats damages awarded under vicarious liability as "simply another cost
of doing business," the court concluded that an affirmative finding of
control would be justified when the third party could "veto" (or,
100. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
101. L at 1163.
102. l
103. Id at 1161.
104. Id at 1162.
105. 855 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1994).
106. See id at 1328-29.
107. See id at 1317.
108. See id. at 1318, 1324 (noting that because plaintiffs failed to offer sufficient evidence of
direct infringement, entire discussion of vicarious liability is dicta, written in order to generate
record for appeal); see also Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996)
(calling Polygram "most recent and comprehensive discussion of the evolution of the doctrine of
vicarious liability for copyright infringement").
109. Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1326.
1017
Washington Law Review
conversely, authorize) the playing of any music "at all" (or sale of any
product, or production of any item of commerce)."' In short, the
contractual ability to restrict all activities satisfied the control test.
Evidence of such control lay in the defendant's reservation of the rights
to prohibit music outright and to police the exhibitors, and in the
defendant's employees ensuring compliance with rules regarding
blocked aisles, food and drink, and construction of booths."l'
C. Fonovisa I Versus Fonovisa II: The Control Debate in the Ninth
Circuit
The standards of legal and actual control collided in the two decisions
of Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc, 12 where the copyright holder
sued a California swap meet,"' alleging vicarious and contributory
liability for the sale of pirated musical recordings on the swap meet
premises." 4 Although the district court (Fonovisa I) found evidence of
neither actual control nor direct financial benefit, and thus no vicarious
liability,"5 the Ninth Circuit (Fonovisa 1H) reversed and adopted the
legal-control standard." 6
The district court held that the general right to deny market access to
all vendors did not amount to the direct supervisory power seen in
Shapiro."7 The court read Shapiro as emphasizing "a priori supervisory
power; that is, the power to supervise the direct infringers in the general
course of business, e.g., what to sell, whom to hire, how much to
charge.""' 8 The court distinguished evidence of actual supervision from
the contractual "sovereignty" of all property owners over their tenants,
lessees, and licensees." 9 Finding that the swap-meet-owners exercised
110. Id. at 1325-26.
111. See id. at 1328-29.
112. 847 F. Supp. 1492 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (Fonovisa I), rev'd, 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Fonovisa II).
113. See Fonovisa II, 76 F.3d at 261 (noting swap meet is forum where customers purchase goods
from independent vendors who pay rental fee to owner; customers pay entrance fee and parking to
owner).
114. See Fonovisa 1, 847 F. Supp. at 1495.
115. See id. at 1496-97.
116. See Fonovisa 11, 76 F. 3d at 262-63.
117. See Fonovisa 1, 847 F. Supp. at 1497.
118. Id.
119. See id.
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the latter but not the former, the court determined that while "[t]his may
be a posteriori supervision... this is not supervisory power in the
context of vicarious infringement."'2 In reaching this conclusion, the
court also reasoned that the swap meet, which did not hire the vendors
but simply provided a forum for market interactions between third
parties, created a relationship more analogous to the landlord and tenant
relationship than the supervised-contractor relationship that the Shapiro
court found similar to the dance-hall cases. 2 '
Like Gershwin and Polygram, the district court also analyzed risk
allocation." Reaching the opposite conclusion from these courts, the
Fonovisa I court read Shapiro's incentive approach as requiring the
power to police "carefully" for infringement and attaching liability only
where such power can be "effectively exercised."'" Because it only
provided "bare" market space without ensuring the integrity~of the goods
or the market, the swap meet was not in the best position to monitor for
copyright infringement. 24 Evidence suggested that the copyright holder
was in the best position to protect its copyrights: the holder hired its own
investigators and instigated sheriff's-department raids.'" The court
concluded that judicially allocating such costs to the market owner would
render marginally profitable enterprises untenable without furthering
Shapiro's goal of preventing shell organizations from acting as liability
shields.
126
The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's reasoning.'27 Focusing
on the swap meet's vendor contracts, the court found that the owner
reserved the right to block market access for any reason, including the
ability to control the discrete activities of individual vendors.'28 In
120. Id.
121. See id.; see also Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Serv., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143,
1150 nA (7th Cir. 1992) (noting in dicta that swap-meet owner accused of vicarious trademark
infringement did not hire vendors and exercised "no more control over its tenants than any landlord
concerned with the safety and convenience of visitors and of its tenants as a group").
122. Despite its similar facts and analysis, Polygram did not mention Fonovisa 1, decided three
months prior.
123. Fonovisa I, 847 F. Supp. at 1496; see also HardRock, 955 F.2d at 1150.
124. See Fonovisa 1, 847 F. Supp. at 1497.
125. Seeid. n.2.
126. See id. at 1497.
127. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262-63 (9th Cir. 1996) (Fonovisa
II).
128. See id. at 262.
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addition, the court gave significant weight to the swap meet's advertising
and control of admission to the premises. 29 This evidence led the court
to conclude that the indicia of control were "strikingly similar to those in
Shapiro and Gershwin."'
130
Fonovisa 11 invoked the line of cases holding that legal control
satisfies the Shapiro test. The court located the antecedents of this line of
cases in the dance hall cases, explicitly rejecting the district court's
landlord-tenant parallel. 3 ' As persuasive authority, Fonovisa II
emphasized the "formal licensing agreement" in Shapiro,3 2 accepted
Gershwin's finding of control based upon position to police, 33 and
endorsed Polygram's finding of control in the enforcement of non-
copyright rules and regulations." However, the court did not mention
Demetriades, Artists Music, or Banff. Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, any
degree of formal or legal control over the forum where copyright
infringement is possible may satisfy the control prong of Shapiro, while
in the Second Circuit, some degree of actual control of the infringing
activity is necessary. Such a split in these circuits exacerbates the
confusion over the control prong in the other circuits. 35 This split in
authority also complicates Shapiro's on-line application, which awaits
decision at the circuit court level.
III. SHAPIRO ON-LINE: CONTROL ON THE INTERNET
Not surprisingly, the control prong of Shapiro presents entirely new
challenges to courts translating common law vicarious liability into the
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. Seeid.
132. Id.
133. Seeid. at 263.
134. See id.
135. See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Serv., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th
Cir. 1992) (emphasizing actual control in dicta); Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 834 (8th
Cir. 1992) (finding vicarious liability on basis of actual control in corporate officers' approval of
sales of infringing book); RCA/Ariola Int'l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 781 (8th
Cir. 1988) (reaching vicarious liability based on actual control of infringing activity). But see
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801, 811 (1 th Cir.
1985) (finding company vicariously liable for acts of independent contractor); Famous Music Corp.
v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1213, 1214 (1st Cir. 1977)
(holding race track owner vicariously liable for infringing performances of independent contractor).
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on-line environment.136 The Internet has revolutionized the ease and
extent of information dissemination, thereby greatly increasing the
potential for copyright infringement' 37 The Internet also raises questions
of categorization 3 ' that render the traditional analogies of vicarious
liability awkward. 139 Furthermore, the on-line environment allows the
immediate formation of innumerable, non-negotiated, contractual
relationships, thus potentially affixing vicarious liability to many more
entities than in a brick-and-mortar environment. Finally, the Internet's
replacement of discrete transactions with simultaneous use of third-party
networks and Web sites makes policing copyright on-line a wholly
different matter from a dance hall owner's policing of an evening's
entertainment.Y
None of the few cases that have ruled on on-line vicarious liability in
general have provided a definition of "control.'' Courts have either
avoided the question of control by finding a lack of financial benefit, 4
2
faced a stipulation of control by the defendant,43 or avoided vicarious
136. See, e.g., David Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernalia of the Digital Age, 10 Harv. J. L.
& Tech. 1, 34 (1996) (claiming vicarious liability threatens to "suffocat[e] the Net through the blind
flailing ofpre-eyberspace principles").
137. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (indicating growth of Intemet's reach);
Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073-74 (9th Cir.
1999) (detailing technological advances making Intemet-based distribution of sound recordings
easier).
138. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 851 (noting that Internet's "information retrieval methods... are
constantly evolving and difficult to categorize precisely").
139. See ia at 853 (analogizing World Wide Web "to both a vast library including millions of
readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering goods and services"); Alex
Alben, What is an On-Line Service? (In the Eyes of the Law), Computer Law., June 1996, at 1, 7
("Specific web sites may be hybrids of the following elements: common carriers, kiosks, dance
halls, libraries, cable public access channels, or even old-fashioned magazines .... "); Kenneth A.
Walton, Note, Is a Website Like a Flea Market Stall? How Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction Increases the
Risk of Third-Party Copyright Infringement Liability for On-line Service Providers, 19 Hastings
Comm. & Ent. LJ. 921, 928 (1997) (noting uncertain placement of service providers along
landlord/dance-hall continuum).
140. See Ballon, supra note 61, at 763.
141. See Jennifer E. Markiewicz, Comment, Seeking Shelterfrom the MP3 Storm: How Far Does
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act On-line Service Provider Liability Limitation Reach?, 7
CommLaw Conspectus 423,427 (1999).
142. See Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Assoc. of Fire Equip. Distrib., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1179
(N.D. Ill. 1997); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netconm On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
143. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171, 1177 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(finding vicarious liability where individuals conceded actual control over defendant corporation).
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liability altogether by finding contributory liability.'" Two leading
decisions ruling on on-line vicarious liability have not clarified
application of the control prong.145
In a case of first impression, the court in Religious Technology Center
v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.,146 found a genuine
issue of fact regarding control but dismissed the vicarious liability claim
on the financial-benefit prong. 47 Defendant Netcom provided Internet
access to an operator of a bulletin board service (BBS), 148 a user of which
posted copies of the plaintiff's copyrighted documents on the BBS.1
49
Bifurcating the control prong into a conjunctive test of "right" and
"ability," the court first cited Netcom's contractual terms and conditions
with its subscribers as evidence of Netcom's right to control infringers'
accounts. 5 ' The court then determined that Netcom had the ability to
"delete specific postings," based upon its prior suspensions of more than
1000 accounts.151 The court concluded that technology probably did not
exist to give Netcom sufficient actual control to police for infringing
activity. '
Similarly, in Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Assoc. of Fire Equipment
Distributors53 (NAFED), the court granted summary judgment on a
144. See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1996); see supra note
44 (describing distinction between contributory and vicarious liability). Some commentators argue
that contributory liability has rendered vicarious liability irrelevant in cases considering copyright
infringement over the Internet. See David N. Weiskopf, The Risks of Copyright Infringement on the
Internet: A Practitioner's Guide, 33 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1, 32 (1998); Cahoy, supra note 99, at 348;
Markiewicz, supra note 141, at 432.
145. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376; Marobie, 983 F. Supp. at 1179. The legislative history of
the DMCA cites both of these cases in discussing benefit but not control. See H.R. Rep. 105-551, pt.
1, at 11, 25 (1998); S. Rep. 105-190, at 19 n.20 (1998).
146. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
147. See id. at 1376-77.
148. See Philip E. Margolis, Random House Webster's Computer & Internet Dictionary 67 (3d
ed. 1999) (defining "bulletin board system" as electronic message center where users can post
messages and read messages posted by others).
149. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp at 1365-66.
150. See id. at 1375-76 (accepting also "netiquette," or custom and usage on Interet, as evidence
of implicit control).
151. See id. at 1376.
152. See id. at 1376 n.23; see also Zeran v. America On-line, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir.
1997) ("It would be impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings for
possible problems."); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 962 n.7
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (suggesting that Internet service providers are not vicariously liable for failing to
monitor content of users' postings).
153. 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
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vicarious-liability claim due to the defendant's lack of financial
benefit."5 The plaintiff created clip-art that defendant NAFED used on a
Web page hosted by the defendant Internet-access-provider Northwest.'
Although it found that evidence of control was unclear,56 the court
emphasized control over the contents of the offending Web page, as
opposed to mere service access. 7 In its brief consideration of control,
the court did not examine Northwest's contract with NAFED for any
right to terminate NAFED's service. 8 To date, no circuit court has
clarified the control prong's application to the Internet.
IV. THE LINK BETWEEN THE DMCA AND THE BENEFIT AND
CONTROL TEST OF COMMON LAW VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Congress passed the Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act (Title
II of the DMCA) in part to clarify the liability of Internet service
providers. 9 Such clarification included protection against direct,
vicarious, and contributory infringement."6 Addressing the needs of
copyright holders, Congress made implementation of a baseline of
security systems designed to ensure protection of copyright holders'
interests a prerequisite of limited liability. The statutory requirements
differ based upon the service provider's activity as it relates to the
alleged infringement. Codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512, Title II limits
qualifying service providers' exposure to secondary liability by
permitting only injunctive relief, not monetary damages, for
infringement.'
61
A. The Baseline of§ 512 's Safe Harbor Provisions
Section 512 limits the extent of liability for on-line copyright
infringement in four types of activity: transitory digital network
154. See id. at 1179.
155. Seei aat 1171.
156. See ia
157. See id at 1179.
158. Seeid
159. See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998).
160. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-796, at 73 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 639, 649;
see also, S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 40; H.R Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 53 (1998).
161. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1), (j) (Supp. IV 1999).
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communications, 62 system caching, 63 user storage," 4 and information
location. 6 These safe harbors offer affirmative defenses to monetary
damages once a court finds a service provider vicariously liable for
copyright infringement."6 While § 512 defines "service provider"
broadly, 167  all service providers seeking protection from monetary
liability for any of the four types of activity must meet common statutory
requirements. Section 512(i) requires service providers seeking
protection to subject all users to a standard policy that allows the
termination of the accounts or subscriptions of repeat infringers." This
section also requires the service provider to accommodate future security
measures as they become available. 69 In turn, the first four subsections
of § 512' impose separate requirements depending upon the type of
activity conducted by the service provider. This Comment examines the
user-storage safe harbor of § 512(c), because this safe harbor will likely
become the DMCA protection most sought after by interactive,
commercial Web sites.'
162. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (Supp. IV 1999).
163. See 17 U.S.C. § 5 12(b) (Supp. IV 1999).
164. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (Supp. IV 1999).
165. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (Supp. IV 1999).
166. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-796, at 73 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 639, 649.
167. The DMCA defines "service provider" as "a provider of on-line services or network access,
or the operator of facilities therefor," and includes an entity offering the transmission, routing, or
providing of connections for digital on-line communications. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp.
IV 1999). Several commentators have observed the breadth of this definition. See, e.g., Elizabeth A.
McNamara et al., On-line Service Provider Liability Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
Comm. Law., Fall 1999, at 5, 6 (noting "definition is broad enough to potentially include employers
that provide e-mail accounts to their employees and other entities-including newspapers,
magazines, and other media companies-that simply host informational Web sites"); Markiewicz,
supra note 141, at 436 (noting that definition "appears to include any business that may operate a
web site or other internet services or facilities, including private network 'intranets'). Many Web
site operators appear to believe that their operations fit within the definition. See U.S. Copyright
Office, Directory of Service Provider Agents for Notification of Claims of Infringement (visited
May 11, 2000) <http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyrightlon-linesp/listlindex.html> (listing, inter alia,
Amazon.com and eBay Inc.). To date, only one court has considered this definition, and it assumed,
without holding, that the Napster system for sharing music over the Internet was a service provider
under the stringent definition of service provider at § 512(k)(1)(A). See A & M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1746,1749 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
168. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1999).
169. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1999)
170. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
171. The first case to consider any safe harbor under the DMCA ruled that the defendant did not
qualify for the "routing and transmission" safe harbor of § 512(a). See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d at
1752. The court did not rule on any other safe harbors, although it noted that § 512(d) might be
1024
DMCA and Vicarious Liability
B. Section 512(c): The User-Storage Limitation
Section 512(c) should appeal to interactive Web sites, including on-
line auction sites, because it implicates activities that allow users to post
copyrighted material on-line, for sale or otherwise." This safe harbor
limits liability for "infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at
the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network
controlled or operated by or for the service provider.""' Protection
against liability under the user storage limitation requires a service
provider to implement a "notice and takedown" procedure by which the
service provider can remove infringing material upon notice from a
copyright holder 74 and to designate an agent whom copyright holders
can contact with claims of infringement.'75 In addition, § 512(c)(1)(B)
makes the user-storage safe harbor available only if the service provider
"does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability
to control such activity."'76 By apparently codifying the language of the
Shapiro test for vicarious liability for copyright infringement, this last
requirement highlights the DMCA's attempt to mediate the conflict
between technological change and established judicial doctrine.177 The
success of this mediation turns upon judicial interpretation of the
statutory, common law, and technological definitions of "control."
applicable and under § 512(n) the safe harbors operate independently. See id at 1750-51. At the
time this Comment went to press, the Napster court had not ruled on the defendant's qualification
for any other safe harbor. In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), a defendant sought the protection of the § 512(c) safe-harbor, but the court noted
that the plaintiffs were not alleging copyright infringement so the safe-harbor provisions of the
DMCA were inapplicable. See Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 217.
172. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (Supp. IV 1999). Section 512(d) covers information location tools,
which are also of interest to most Web sites. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (Supp. IV 1998). Significantly,
§ 512(d) imposes the same requirements for safe harbor as § 512(c). See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)-(3).
173. 17 U.S.C. § 512(cX1).
174. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C). Two other safe harbors require notice and takedown
provisions as well. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E) (Supp. IV 1999) (addressing system caching); 17
U.S.C. § 512(d)(3) (addressing information-location tools).
175. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2).
176. 17 U.S.C. § 512(cXl)(B).
177. See H.R. Rep. 105-55 1, pt. 1, at 11 (1998); S. Rep. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
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V. INTERPRETING COURTS SHOULD READ ACTUAL
CONTROL INTO 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B)
The text, structure, and history of Title II support reading an actual-
control standard into 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B). A standard requiring
"some continuing connection.., in regard to the infringing activity"'' 7
would allow courts to preserve the user-storage safe harbor for some
service providers found vicariously liable. This construction would
harmonize vicarious liability for copyright infringement with statutory
limits on liability. An actual-control standard would avoid structural
conflict by requiring a showing of control that exceeds the legal control
required by § 512's other prerequisites.7 7 This standard would also allow
courts to heed congressional intent not to overhaul vicarious liability
while encouraging the growth of the Internet in limited-liability zones. 8
Finally, an actual-control standard will result in a net increase in
effective monitoring for copyright infringement.
A. An Actual-Control Standard Can Preserve Safe Harbors for Service
Providers Found Vicariously Liable
Predicating removal from the user-storage safe harbor under
§ 512(c)(1)(B) on a finding of actual control, as contemplated by Banff,
Ltd. v. Limited, Inc.,18 would allow courts to reconcile this safe harbor
with common law vicarious liability. This approach would follow
Demetriades v. Kauffman's refinement of the Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.
v. H.L. Green Co. test, in seeking "meaningful evidence"' 2 of "the
power to police carefully."'83 Such evidence would exist in decisions,
regulations, and procedures structuring the infringing activity as distinct
from other activities. An actual-control standard would also follow
Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publishing, Inc. in weighing the costs of
surveillance 84 and attach responsibility only "where it can and should be
178. Banff, Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, I 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
179. See Ian C. Ballon, E-Commerce and Internet Law § 8.12[6][C] (forthcoming 2000)
(manuscript at 8-140).
180. See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998).
181. See 869 F. Supp. at 1110.
182. Demetriades v. Kauffman, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y 1988).
183. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963).
184. 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1623, 1627 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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effectively exercised."' 5 The clearest example of effective exercise
would lie in the supervision seen in RCA/Ariola International, Inc. v.
Thomas & Grayston. '8 Consideration of such evidence would allow
courts to employ both vicarious liability and statutory protection.
An actual-control standard would clarify service provider liability
while leaving vicarious liability unaffected. Because Title II's safe
harbors act as shields from liability for monetary damages after a court
has found a service provider liable,'87 courts should be able to identify
three types of control in order to reconcile vicarious liability and
§ 512(c)(1)(B): (1) a complete lack of control precluding a finding of
vicarious liability, (2) a degree of control that supports a finding of
vicarious liability but does not remove the service provider from the
statutory safe harbor, and (3) control that results in a finding of vicarious
liability and satisfies § 512(c)(1)(B) so as to prompt an inquiry into
financial benefit. The first type does not implicate the DMCA because it
does not establish liability. Reading the second type as legal control
allows the operation of both common law doctrine and statutory
protection, while the third defines a type of control that jeopardizes the
user-storage safe harbor in all circuit courts. This approach would leave
unchanged the application of Shapiro-with either a legal- or actual-
control standard-to all defendants, while protecting on-line service
providers exercising only legal control over user storage.
Judicial clarification of control would be particularly helpful to
service providers, such as eBay, that receive revenue based on a
percentage of the sale between two parties. 8' Whether these entities
qualify for safe-harbor protection would seem to hinge upon the control
prong of vicarious liability. Because a percentage of the final sale would
satisfy the benefit prong, any showing of control would expose the entity
to liability for infringement on its site and remove it from the DMCA
safe harbor. EBay's perceived disincentive to monitoring reflects this
fear of evidencing control.' 9
Judicial clarification of § 512(c) would alleviate concerns such as
eBay's. Infringement in the context of an on-line auction would most
185. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308.
186. 845 F.2d 773, 781 (8th Cir. 1988).
187. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
188. See eBay Seller Guide, supra note 10.
189. See Richtel, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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likely entail unauthorized distribution.19 Actual control could be found
in any involvement by the auction site in deciding what, where, how, or
for what price to sell.' As a forum for market transactions, the auction
site generally would maintain only legal control to remove items upon
notification of infringement. With notification the primary means of
discovering infringement, an auction site would not be in a meaningful
position to remove infringing items until after such notification. Thus, an
entity like an auction service would have to engage in something more
than its normal business to jeopardize the limitation on liability under
§ 512(c)(1)(B).
B. The Structure of§ 512 Supports an Actual-Control Construction
Because Reading Legal Control into the Statute Would Render
Statutory Language Superfluous
Judicial deference to the plain meaning of § 512(c)(1)(B) would create
an irreparable statutory conflict. Interpretation of this section as
codifying the legal-control standard of Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction,
Inc., (Fonovisa 11)192 would produce a similar result. Preclusion of safe
harbor protection for vicariously liable service providers would render
§ 512(c)(1)(B) ambiguous. Furthermore, because Fonovisa H approx-
imates control otherwise required by § 512, adoption of the legal-control
standard would strip the concluding phrase of § 512(c)(1)(B) ("in a case
in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such
activity") of all significance. Either approach would do damage to the
text of the DMCA.
Were a court to hold that the plain meaning of § 512(c)(1)(B) merely
codifies vicarious liability, 93 no vicariously liable service provider
would qualify for the user-storage safe harbor."9 Section 512 precludes
190. While the direct infringer might be liable for unauthorized duplication per 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(1), sale at an on-line auction would implicate the right to distribute of 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). See
H.R. Rep. 105-551, pt. 2, at 53 (1998) ("The term 'activity' is intended ... to refer to wrongful
activity that is occurring at the site on the provider's system or network at which the material resides
191. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1496 (E.D. Cal. 1994)
(Fonovia I), rev'd, 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) (Fonovisa II).
192. 76 F.3d 259, 262-63 (9th Cir. 1996).
193. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 44, § 12B.04[A][2], at 12B-36 (claiming that §
512(c)(1)(B) codifies vicarious liability).
194. See Ballon, supra note 179, § 8.12[6][C] (manuscript at 8-140).
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monetary liability after a service provider has been found liable.195 By
judicial definition, a vicariously liable service provider will already have
been found to exercise control over, and receive direct financial benefit
from, the infringing activity.1 96 An interpretation that § 512(c)(1)(B)
merely codifies vicarious liability without distinguishing standards of
control would mean that only a service provider that either had no ability
to control or received no benefit would be able to take advantage of the
safe harbor. Such a service provider, however, would not need a safe
harbor from monetary damages because no court would have found it
vicariously liable. One commentator has noted that "[i]t is certainly not
beyond the realm of possibility that Congress ultimately enacted a much-
trumpeted liability limitation that in fact provides only modest benefits
(if any) for most Service Providers."'97 However, a purported liability
limitation that does not limit liability would result in an unintended
absurdity precluding a plain meaning approach to construction even for
the most rigid textualists.'98
Furthermore, the prerequisites for safe-harbor protection under
sections 512(i) and (c) satisfy the standard of legal control over potential
infringers. Section 512(i) mandates that a service provider seeking any
safe-harbor protection must maintain the contractual right to terminate
the accounts of its users.' 9 Similarly, Fonovisa II interpreted [Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co.2"o as requiring only contractual
control over the direct infringement to establish vicarious liability.2"'
Therefore, a legal-control reading of § 512(c)(1)(B) would mean that
compliance with § 512(i) would violate the Fonovisa II standard. There
could be no control that would satisfy Fonovisa 1I yet qualify for safe-
harbor protection under § 512(c). 0' In addition, compliance with the
195. See IL.P Conf. Rep. No. 105-796, at 73, reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N 639, 649; see also
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary, at 9 (visited Feb.
26, 2000) <http:l/lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/Iegislation/dmca.pdf>.
196. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304,307 (2d Cir. 1963).
197. Ballon, supra note 179, § 8.12[6][C] (manuscript at 8-140).
198. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 45-46 (1994).
199. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (Supp. IV 1999).
200. 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
201. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996) (Fonovisa If);
supra note 132 and accompanying text.
202. See Walton, supra note 139, at 943 ("Fonovisa [I1] seems to stand for the principle that the
'control' element is satisfied by any level of control beyond that which a landlord has over a
leasehold tenant.").
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"designated agent" requirement of § 512(c)(2). 3  would provide
sufficient evidence of control under the analysis in Gershwin Publishing
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management,2" which found control based on
the defendant's position to police the infringing activity, 205 for a
designated agent would occupy such a position. Finally, the "notice and
takedown" procedure of § 512(c)(1)(C) °6 falls within the veto power
over all activity that might otherwise include infringement cited by
Polygram International Publishing, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc.2 7 as
evidence of control.08
Therefore, reading legal control into § 512(c)(1)(B) produces a fatal
structural conflict. If a court construes § 512(c)(1)(B) as coterminous
with the legal-control standard of Fonovisa II, the phrase "in a case in
which the service provider has the right and ability to control such
activity"20 9 becomes superfluous because every qualifying service
provider would be such a case.210 The requirements of § 512 would
negate control as a test for safe-harbor protection under § 512(c)(1)(B)
and direct financial benefit would become the sole determinant of safe-
arbor protection. It is possible that Congress simply meant for
§ 512(c)(1)(B) to adopt the NetcomlMarobie exemption from direct
financial benefit for "flat fee" arrangements,2 ' thus making financial
benefit the sole indicator of safe harbor preclusion. Giving effect to this
possible intent, however, would also render superfluous the control
phrase of § 512(c)(1)(B), while ignoring e-commerce models like eBay
203. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1999).
204. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
205. See id. at 1163; supra note 133 and accompanying text.
206. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1999).
207. 855 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1994).
208. See id. at 1326; supra note 110 and accompanying text.
209. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1999).
210. See Ballon, supra note 179, § 8.12[6][C], (manuscript at 8-139).
211. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 25 (1998) (stating that test for financial benefit
contemplated by § 512(c)(1)(B) is found in Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Assoc. of Fire Equip.
Distrib., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. I1l. 1997)). Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Assoc. of Fire Equip.
Distrib., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. III. 1997) distinguished flat fees and percentage-based fee
structures, with the former not satisfying the Shapiro "direct financial benefit" prong. See 983 F.
Supp. at 1179. However, the Fonovisa II court held that flat fees and indirect benefit satisfy the
benefit prong of the Shapiro test. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263 (9th
Cir. 1996) (Fonovisa I]). Under either approach, § 512(c)(1)(B) requires a benefit analysis after a
service provider has been found vicariously liable. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
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that receive a direct percentage of a third-party transaction yet exercise
little or no actual control over each sale.
A principal canon of statutory interpretation, however, cautions
against rendering statutory language superfluous or unnecessary.1 2
Requiring evidence of actual control for removal from the user-storage
safe harbor under § 512(c)(1)(B) would eliminate structural conflict
within § 512 by preserving the control language of § 512(c)(1)(B).
Courts could denominate a class of service providers that is in
compliance with the statutory baseline of control in §§ 512(c) and (i) yet
does not exercise sufficient control over the infringer to jeopardize safe-
harbor protection. Only actual control plus direct financial benefit would
remove a service provider's liability limitation.1 3 Service providers that
exercised only legal control, regardless of financial benefit, would
remain eligible for the liability limitation because § 512(c)(1)(B) would
retain the conjunctive test of benefit and control for removal from the
safe harbor. Reading actual control into § 512(c)(1)(B) would do the
least damage to the statute.
C. Legislative History Tips the Scale Toward an Actual-Control
Standard
Even though the DMCA does not explicitly acknowledge a distinction
between legal and actual control, the legislative history suggests allowing
for some control that would not preclude safe-harbor limitation.
Furthermore, the committee reports leave no doubt that Congress
intended to provide some relief from vicarious liability. A reading of
§ 512(c)(1)(B) that forecloses the availability of protection to a vicarious
infringer contradicts this intent.
212. See Eskridge, supra note 198, at 324 (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778
(1988)).
213. This reading of § 512(c)(1)(B) would create four classes of vicariously liable service
providers, assuming a court were to follow Fonovisa II and allow indirect benefits (flat fees or
advertising, for example) to satisfy the Shapiro benefit prong. See Fonovisa, 76 F. 3d at 263
(Fonovisa RI). The classes would be: (1) legal control plus indirect benefit (safe harbor), (2) legal
control plus direct benefit (safe harbor), (3) actual control plus indirect benefit (safe harbor), (4)
actual control plus direct benefit (no safe harbor).
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1. House Committee Reports Support an Actual-Control Construction
of§ 512(c) (1) (B)
The Report of the House Conference Committee contemplates a
degree of active control that would not jeopardize a service provider's
safe harbor.1 4 The committee indicated, "courts should not conclude that
the service provider loses eligibility for limitations on liability under
section 512 solely because it engaged in a monitoring program."2 5
Whether monitoring plus direct financial benefit would amount to
control that precludes safe harbor is unclear. Nonetheless, this report
suggests that some degree of service-provider control should not
preclude a limitation on liability.
216
The only explicit reference to the control prong of Shapiro in the
legislative history of the DMCA rejects a formalistic approach to control.
The House Judiciary Committee stated:
The "right and ability to control" language in Subparagraph (B)
codifies the second element of vicarious liability. It is not intended
to limit this element purely to formal indicia of control such as the
presence or absence of a contractual provision. Rather,
Subparagraph (B) is intended to preserve existing case law that
examines all relevant aspects of the relationship between the
primary and secondary infringer.2"7
Despite the apparent conflict with the Senate Judiciary Committee's
disavowal of any "wholesale clarification" of vicarious liability,2"8 this
passage complements the Senate report by suggesting the type of inquiry
that could preserve a safe-harbor defense for a service provider that had
already been found vicariously liable for copyright infringement.
Disavowing "formal indicia of control," this inquiry rejects the "right to
terminate ... for any reason whatsoever" standard of Fonovisa H1."9
214. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-796, at 73 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 639, 649.
215. Id. at 73, reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 649.
216. See Ballon, supra note 179, §8.12[6][C] (manuscript at 8-141) ("[I]t may be inferred that a
Service Provider may not be found to have 'the ... ability to control . . .' an act of infringement
merely because it monitors content on-line." (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1999))).
217. H.1L Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 26 (1998).
218. S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998).
219. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996) (Fonovisa II).
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2. Congress Intended to Provide Safe Harbor from Vicarious Liability
Three separate committees explicitly reported that Title II is intended
to "protect qualifying service providers from liability for all monetary
relief for direct, vicarious and contributory infringement.
22
Furthermore, the legislative history suggests an intention to leave
common law vicarious liability unaltered while codifying something
more than mere legal control as the prerequisite for preclusion of a safe-
harbor defense."1 The Senate Judiciary Committee stated that, "[it]
decided to leave current law in its evolving state and, instead, to create a
series of 'safe harbors' for certain common activities of service
providers." m While a court could still find an on-line auction site (or any
other service provider) vicariously liable using either a legal- or actual-
control standard, it should preserve some mechanism to acknowledge
this congressional intent to allow for a safe-harbor limit on vicarious
liability.
D. An Actual-Control Standard Provides Maximum Incentives to
Monitor for On-line Copyright Infringement
Even though the DMCA neither requires a service provider to monitor
its service to qualify for a safe harbor from monetary liabilitym nor
provides any incentives to monitor, any construction of the user-storage
safe harbor should avoid disincentives to monitoring in order to
maximize copyright protection. Reading a legal standard of control into
§ 512(c)(1)(B) would produce both facial disincentives to monitoring
and actual disincentives because courts could preclude vicariously liable
service providers from safe-harbor protection altogether based on their
monitoring activities. Conversely, an actual-control standard would
allow monitoring for infringement without exposure to monetary
liability. Absent any continuing connection directly related to the
infringing activity, an entity such as eBay would be free to monitor its
site without the disincentive of potential monetary liability.
220. H.R_ Conf. Rep. No. 105-796, at 73, reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 649; S. Rep. No.
105-190, at 40; see also H. R. Rep. No. 105-55 1, pt. 2, at 53.
221. See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 19.
222. Id.
223. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (Supp. V 1999).
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Congress did not intend Title I1 to discourage monitoring by service
providers.224 Instead, in Title II Congress contemplated "strong
incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to
detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital
networked environment. '2 5 Because the clearest incentive to service
providers is to spur action upon notification of the presence of infringing
material,226 Title II shifts the burden of monitoring for infringement to
copyright owners. This approach marks a significant retreat from the
risk-allocation approach of Polygram, where vicarious liability was
treated as "simply another cost of doing business." '227 Such a retreat is not
unreasonable, however, given that the notice and takedown provision of
§ 512(c)(1)(C) 28 allows copyright owners to have "infringing content
removed from the Internet [quickly and inexpensively]. '29 At the very
least, construction of § 512(c)(1)(B) should not produce disincentives to
monitoring.
Yet the plain language of § 512(c) does suggest such disincentives for
a service provider that receives a direct financial benefit from potentially
infringing activity but whose business model minimizes control. With
financial benefit a given, safe-harbor protection would turn on control,
and any evidence of legal control could expose the service provider to
full monetary liability. Seeking to avoid any evidence of control, the
service provider could avoid monitoring its site altogether.
Judicial preclusion of safe-harbor protection for such entities by
addressing them under traditional vicarious liability would also provide
disincentives to monitoring. For an entity like eBay that receives up to
half a million postings per day, monitoring, even if physically possible,
would be prohibitively expensive under such a de facto strict-liability
standard. 3' Thus, an on-line auction would face three options: (1)
monitor as best as possible, (2) refuse to monitor and treat liability as
224. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-796, at 73, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 649.
225. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-796, at 72, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 649 (emphasis added).
226. See Christian C. M. Beams, Note, The Copyright Dilemma Involving On-line Service
Providers: Problem Solved... For Now, 51 Fed. Comm. L.J. 823, 846 (1999).
227. Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1325-26 (D. Mass.
1994).
228. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
229. Ballon, supra note 179, § 8.12[1] (manuscript at 8-126).
230. See Skelton, supra note 98, at 274 (noting that effective monitoring for infringement
requires: (1) identifying potential infringement, (2) making legal decision about violation of
exclusive rights, and (3) making further legal decision about potential fair use).
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"simply another cost of doing business," or (3) prohibit the sale of any
item that could potentially infringe copyright.
None of these options would increase market efficiency, and on-line
auctions would still face the uncertainty of divergent liability standards
in different circuits despite Congress's intent to provide certainty."' The
first option would be the least attractive, because an auction would incur
,costs of both monitoring and liability. Unprotected monitoring would
still expose the auction site to vicarious liability for any missed
infringement, while the prohibitive costs of absolute monitoring would
render every surveillance system imperfect. The second option would
arguably produce no net market loss aside from the high transaction costs
of litigation, because the service provider would simply compensate the
copyright owner for lost sales. 2 However, only sufficiently steep
statutory penalties would prevent a general disregard of copyright law. 3
Otherwise, infringement would become an accepted part of doing
business. Finally, the third option would result in a net economic loss
because a desirable activity (the buying and selling of all copyrightable
expression in an auction market) would be eliminated. In addition, all
three of these options would deny copyright holders the "valuable extra-
judicial remedies" provided by the notice and takedown procedure of
§ 512(c)(1)(C).2 4
Only a reading of actual control as the predicate to the loss of limited
liability for vicarious infringement will not discourage monitoring. While
it requires some control, monitoring should not implicate a "continuing
connection... in regard to the infringing activity." ' Absent the threat
of safe-harbor preclusion, service providers could readily supplement the
notice and takedown safeguard with an active monitoring program,
thereby maximizing detection of infringement. Although this solution
requires more active monitoring by copyright holders in order to fulfill
the notice procedures of § 512(c)(1)(C), it is arguable that copyright
holders are in a better position to police infringement at a lower cost,2
6
231. See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998).
232. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1994) (providing actual damages and profits from infringement).
233. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994) (providing statutory damages up to $100,000 for willful
infringement only).
234. Ballon, supra note 179, § 8.12[1] (manuscript at 8-126).
235. Banff, Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
236. See Skelton, supra note 98, at 289-99 (surveying content providers' superior technological
ability to monitor).
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particularly given the cost-effectiveness of the notice and takedown
procedure. 37 In sum, because the overall cost to the market of policing
would diminish as cooperation between copyright holders and service
providers would prevent more infringement at less cost, reading actual
control into § 512(c)(1)(B) would most likely produce the greatest
market efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION
Technology challenges conventional definitions of control. While all
digital transactions are susceptible to control, the sheer volume of
transactions over a server or Web site at any given time belies the
efficacy of such control. Yet courts are unlikely to abandon vicarious
liability as a tool for enforcing copyright over the Internet. Four
arguments favor reading actual control into the safe-harbor preclusion of
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
First, an actual-control standard would leave unchanged the
application of the two-part test for vicarious liability to all defendants,
while offering a liability limitation for on-line service providers. The
user-storage safe harbor would thus operate as a congressionally
mandated, technology-specific exception to common law liability.
Second, the structure of § 512 suggests an actual-control standard. All
service providers in compliance with § 512's requirements would have
the right and ability to control infringement, so reading legal control into
§ 512(c)(1)(B) would render the control clause superfluous by making
direct financial benefit the sole determinant of preclusion. Third, the
legislative history of § 512 supports an actual-control standard that
would leave room for voluntary monitoring programs. Finally, an actual-
control standard clarifies service provider liability without impeding
voluntary monitoring. If only a continuing connection directly related to
the infringing activity would jeopardize the safe harbor, monitoring alone
would not be dispositive. This approach would preserve the incentive to
monitor that animates the doctrine of vicarious liability. These rationales
indicate that an actual-control standard would contribute textual and
economic certainty to the DMCA's mediation of judicial doctrine and
technological innovation.
237. See Ballon, supra note 179, § 8.12[1] (manuscript at 8-126).
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